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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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12 NOVEMBER 1970
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 2 - 8 NOVEMBER 1970

Moscow (3462 items)

October Revolution Anniversary	(4%)	39%
[Suslov Speech	(--)	6%]
[Grechko Speech	(--)	5%]
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	4%]
China	(4%)	4%
WFDY Meeting in Budapest	(1%)	4%
Middle East	(2%)	3%
DPRK Party Congress	(0.1%)	3%
Indochina	(6%)	3%
U.S. Elections	(0.4%)	2%
Investiture of Allende in Chile	(1%)	1%

Peking (3020 items)

Domestic Issues	(21%)	26%
Indochina	(9%)	16%
[Vietnam	(3%)	10%]
[Cambodia	(3%)	6%]
Japan	(10%)	11%
[Defense Statements	(3%)	5%]
[Socialist Delegation in PRC	(2%)	4%]
PRC-Italian Diplomatic Relations	(--)	4%
U.S. Elections	(--)	4%
DPRK Party Congress	(--)	3%
October Revolution Anniversary	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

The results of the 3 November U.S. elections are assessed as a "defeat" for President Nixon in DRV delegate Xuan Thuy's remarks at the Paris session on the 5th and in other communist comment. While observing that voters were influenced by economic and other domestic issues, an article in the DRV party organ NHAN DAN on the 6th says the elections also proved that the President was wrong in his belief that antiwar sentiments could be "defused" by propagandizing Vietnamization and his five-point peace proposal. Current comment is virtually silent on the substance of the five points: Xuan Thuy at the Paris session did deprecate the President's stand on withdrawal, a cease-fire, and a political settlement in some detail, but this is not reflected in the VNA account.

PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh at the Paris session read a "special statement" on the widespread flooding in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. Voluminous Hanoi and Liberation Radio propaganda stresses communist relief measures and claims that allied military action contributed to the damage.

The October Revolution anniversary provides an occasion for restatement of the Soviet policy of material aid for the Vietnamese struggle and support of the PRG proposals for a settlement. Suslov in his keynote speech voiced pro forma criticism of "U.S. imperialist aggression" in Indochina and ignored the President's five-point proposal.

Peking propaganda pegged to Cambodian National Day (9 November) contains passing, derogatory references to the President's proposal without acknowledging its substance. Sihanouk, at the Peking rally at which Chou En-lai also spoke, ridiculed the proposal and repeated the line that the Indochinese peoples should be allowed to settle their own problems.

Continuing propaganda on the "correct" NLHS five-point solution of the Laotian dispute includes the Pathet Lao radio's 9 November announcement that Prince Souphanouvong's special envoy, Tiao Souk Vangsak, returned to Vientiane and expressed the hope that Souvanna Phouma would now "give an appropriate response" so that plenipotentiaries of the two princes could soon meet.

U.S. ELECTIONS ASSESSED AS DEFEAT FOR PRESIDENT NIXON

HANOI AND THE FRONT Initial DRV reaction to the U.S. elections comes on the 5th, in routine propaganda as well as in DRV delegate Xuan Thuy's statement at the 91st session of the Paris talks. PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh ignored the elections completely in her statement at the session, but

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there is Front comment beginning on the 6th. The VNA account of the session reports Xuan Thuy's observation that the President failed in his attempt to convince the people, "through fallacious propaganda," of his desire to end the war and that he was foiled in his attempt to elect a majority of Republicans "in order to implement more reactionary internal and external policies."

VNA omits some of Thuy's more acerbic remarks, however; thus it ignores his charge that in the campaign the President "deliberately resorted to lying to mislead American public opinion" and his remark that Senator Muskie "himself accused President Nixon of leading, inspiring, and guiding a political campaign built on lies, slander, name-calling, and deception of almost unprecedented volume."

VNA typically does not acknowledge the remarks in the give-and-take portion of the session and hence ignores the exchange in which Ambassador Bruce took exception to Thuy's "choice of words and attitude" in regard to President Nixon, calling them "shameful and totally inadmissible," and in which Thuy reaffirmed his previous statements.

VNA on the 6th, reviewing articles in the party paper NHAN DAN and the army's QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, observes that the "bitter failure" of President Nixon and his party "drew long comments in Hanoi papers." Extracts from the NHAN DAN article were also carried by Hanoi radio, with the notation that it was written by Nguyen Huu Chinh--the author of a detailed analysis of the election campaign on 31 October. Chinh says that the Republican campaign tactics of stressing law and order and using rough language and "slanderous tricks" did not overwhelm the Democratic Party's criticism of the war in Vietnam, unemployment, and inflation. Chinh refers briefly to the President's "deceitful" speech of 7 October and says the elections showed that the President was wrong in his belief that "raving about Vietnamization and making noisy propaganda for the five-point peace initiative" would defuse antiwar sentiments.

Chinh stresses that the results do not mean the U.S. electorate has forgotten the Johnson Administration's expansion of the Vietnam war, but that the vote primarily expressed discontent over what the Nixon Administration has done in the past two years. A Liberation Radio commentary, also on the 6th, says in a similar vein that "the question does not lie with either

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the Democratic or the Republican party but with the fact that whoever really stands for an end to the war will be supported by the U.S. people." It adds that the South Vietnamese people "never cherish any illusions" about either the Democrats or the Republicans but that "anyone holding power" in the United States must "seriously respond" to the two questions raised by the PRG in Paris: Will the United States agree to unconditionally withdraw all troops before 30 June 1971, and does it agree to "forsake the U.S.-supported puppet Thieu-Khieu clique and to allow the South Vietnamese people to determine their own fate?"

MOSCOW Moscow says the U.S. election results show that the American public is not enthusiastic about the President's foreign policy, and some commentators say his continuation of the Vietnam war is a "main reason" for Republican setbacks. There is no explicit mention of the President's five points, but a 5 November Radio Peace and Progress commentary in English remarks cryptically that the President tried to convince the electorate that he is "sincerely striving for peace in Indochina and intends to pull out the U.S. troops from Vietnam." A Radio Moscow broadcast in English on the 6th recalls that President Johnson was forced to quit the political scene because of his "military gamble" and comments that the mid-term election looked like the first round of the 1972 Presidential elections.

XUAN THUY ON PRESIDENT'S PLAN, MME. BINH ON VIETNAMIZATION

DRV delegate Xuan Thuy at the Paris session on the 5th prefaced his discussion of the U.S. elections with what the VNA account called--somewhat inaccurately--a "point by point" analysis of the President's five-point peace proposal. Thuy in fact did not mention the President's call for the immediate release of prisoners of war or his proposal for a broad Indochina conference.

The cursory VNA account goes on to say merely that Thuy "pointed out that the United States has set unreasonable conditions for an end to the war in Vietnam." The account thus obscures the details of his discussion of a cease-fire, troop withdrawal, and a political settlement: Thuy again set out to demonstrate that it is the United States, not the communist side, which is setting forth preconditions for a

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settlement--in its call for a "mutual" troop withdrawal, a cease-fire in place while massive U.S. troop contingents remain, and self-determination which in fact means continued imposition of the "corrupt" Thieu-Ky-Khiem regime.

Unlike Thuy, Mme. Bin -who spoke first at the session--said nothing about the U.S. elections and did not discuss the President's five-point proposal. Instead she attacked the Vietnamization policy and deplored U.S. attempts to achieve a position of strength on the battlefield and at the conference table; many of the details of her remarks go unreported in the VNA and Front media accounts. In her diatribe against the Saigon leaders she repeated her standard claim that even members of the "puppet" army and administration are more and more resolved to overthrow the Thieu regime. Like Thuy, she concluded her formal statement with the usual assertion that the PRG proposals provide the basis for a correct settlement.

VNA covered the allied delegates' remarks in one cryptic sentence: "Speaking next, both the U.S. and Thieu-Ky-Khiem chief delegates obdurately opposed the fair and reasonable eight-point clarifications of the PRG."

VIETNAM TRADE UNION APPEAL FOR CEASE-FIRE, WITHDRAWAL SCORED

A South Vietnamese trade union proposal for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of North Vietnamese as well as U.S. troops from the South is sharply attacked by Liberation Radio on 5 November and in a Hanoi broadcast in Vietnamese to the South on the 9th. Liberation Radio cites "reports from Saigon" that "after two days of meeting at U.S. gunpoint under the command of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique, on 3 November Tran Quoc Buu, on behalf of the workers, laborers, and trade unions, issued an appeal demanding an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of all U.S. and allied troops and North Vietnamese troops." The broadcast charges that

the U.S. Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique asked secret agent Tran Quoc Buu* to issue . . . an appeal which is consistent with the deceitful

* Liberation Radio on 2, 3, and 4 November broadcast a series of articles, attributed to Ngoc Phu, which denounced Tran Quoc Buu as an agent for the CIA and others and described his "oppression of the workers movement" since 1955.

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arguments of Nixon and which is aimed at creating an illusion among public opinion . . . and at dividing and misleading the struggle movement of the workers and laborers and urbanite compatriots of all walks of life.

Liberation Radio says President Nixon's proposal for a cease-fire--"repeated" by Buu--has already been "strongly denounced by many strata of people in Saigon." The Hanoi broadcast on the 9th also says that Buu's proposal merely echoes President Nixon's, and it comments that "the U.S. imperialists have forced Thieu to use Buu, as they did with Thich Tam Chau, to wage propaganda for this U.S. political merchandise." The broadcast claims that "everyone" is aware that Buu "is a professional secret agent, transferred from the French to the CIA and disguised as chairman of the General Confederation of Trade Unions." It adds that "therefore the appeal for a cease-fire and for mutual troop withdrawal issued by Tran Quoc Buu is a worthless appeal" and "cannot be taken as an appeal from the workers and laborers of the southern cities."

GENERAL MINH'S REMARKS ON SAIGON GOVERNMENT REPORTED

HANOI AND THE FRONT Remarks by Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh at activities marking GVN National Day on 1 November are publicized by North and South Vietnamese communist media, but only one VNA item identifies Minh by name. A Hanoi broadcast in Vietnamese to the South on 1 November said that a Saigon meeting on 30 October "opened a new political campaign in which all elements opposed to the Thieu government would participate." The broadcast went on to report that a "retired puppet general" at the meeting "unhesitatingly criticized the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique" and said that "'only a government trusted by the people and including the true representatives of the people can achieve peace in South Vietnam.'"

VNA on the 5th, reporting the same event, cited the same remarks and attributed them to Minh, explaining that he is a former general and was "a participant in the anti-Diem coup." It did not go on to mention his position as head of state, however. VNA noted that the Saigon meeting was organized by Tran Van Don, "former general in the puppet army and architect in the 1963 coup which toppled dictator Ngo Dinh Diem."

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LPA's report, on the 4th, also took note of the meeting organized by Don and quoted the same remark but did not attribute it explicitly to Minh. LPA also went on to say that one of the "puppet" generals at a Buddhist reception on 1 November "predicted that 'many events' would take place from now until the election date"--a remark Western news agencies attributed to Minh. LPA also claimed that this same general at that reception announced that he would run in next year's presidential elections.

BACKGROUND: Despite the reports of Minh's recent statements, Vietnamese communist media did not acknowledge the fact that PRG Foreign Minister Binh had been questioned about his remarks on her return to Paris from London on 2 November. This silence is consistent with the media's reticence regarding questions put to Mme. Binh a year ago, at a luncheon given by the Foreign Press Association in Paris on 14 November 1969. Both Hanoi and the Front failed to acknowledge that her remarks were in response to a question about Minh when they quoted her as saying that the PRG was ready to talk with anyone who approves peace, independence, and neutrality, who opposes the GVN, and who wins the confidence of the urban populace; they did not report that her remarks in this connection were made in response to a question as to whether Gen. Minh would be a valuable interlocutor.

A 16 September 1968 Liberation Radio commentary offered no comment on Minh himself in reacting to the 14 September statement by Thieu that Minh would be invited back to Saigon to assume the post of special advisor. The commentary claimed that the move was ordered by the United States to prove that the GVN had been broadened to "include opposition factions."

TASS REPORT, In contrast to Vietnamese communist silence,
COMMENTARY TASS on 2 November reported that Mme. Binh had been asked about Minh. The exchange is also recalled in a TASS commentary by Kharkov on the 4th. Commenting on the PRG's point on a coalition government, Kharkov recalls that on 2 November in Paris, questioned about Gen. Duong Van Minh's call in Saigon the day before for national reconciliation, Mme. Binh replied: "We are ready to establish contacts with any leaders, with the exception of Thieu, Ky, and Khiem, who come out for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy in order to discuss problems of ending the war and forming a coalition government."

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OCTOBER REVOLUTION: SOVIET AID, SUPPORT FOR PRG PROPOSAL

In his October Revolution anniversary keynote speech Suslov condemned the "war of annihilation" in Vietnam, calling the conflict "the longest and most bloody one after the Second World War" and noting that it has now spread to Cambodia and Laos. But the Vietnamese people, aided by the USSR, he said, have countered the plans of the aggressor and compelled him to resort to various "subterfuges." Suslov described "Vietnamization" of the conflict or "Americanization" of the settlement as merely attempts to cast the "old policy" of continued aggression in a "new form": This is why the Paris talks are "marking time." He repeated the avowal that the Soviets "highly value the constructive initiative" of the PRG, whose proposals constitute a "good and just basis" for ending the war. However, he did not mention President Nixon's five points, saying merely that "the main thing" is that the United States stop its aggression and withdraw its troops.

Speaking at Red Square on the anniversary, Grechko noted briefly that the USSR is providing "all-round aid and support" to Vietnam's struggle against the "intervention" of U.S. imperialism.

Standard Vietnamese communist observance of the October Revolution anniversary included greetings messages from the DRV and PRG leaders, a Hanoi meeting sponsored by the Fatherland Front and friendship societies, and publicity for a reception hosted by the Soviet ambassador at which Pham Van Dong was the ranking guest.

Gratitude for Soviet aid and support was expressed as usual. Criticism of President Nixon's peace initiative come from, among others, Pham Van Dong at the Soviet ambassador's reception. According to the Hanoi domestic service on the 8th, he called the initiative a "perfidious trick" aimed at fooling public opinion and at "avoiding compliance with the fair and reasonable eight points of the PRG."

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COMMUNIST MEDIA MARK CAMBODIAN NATIONAL DAY

PRC COMMENT, Peking media devote considerable attention to
SIHANOUK Cambodian National Day (9 November) with
publicity for a congratulatory message from
Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu and Chou En-lai to Sihanouk and
Penn Nouth, a Peking rally addressed by Sihanouk as well
as Chou En-lai, and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. Stress,
predictably, is on the successes of the Cambodian patriots
in their struggle against U.S. imperialism and its "lackeys."
The Chinese leaders' greeting calls the Chinese and
Cambodian peoples "comrades in arms going together through
thick and thin," and it goes on to predict "complete
victory" given unity of the three Indochinese peoples
persevering in protracted war.

Chou En-lai in his rally speech comments along similar lines
and also criticizes the United States for continuing to use
"counter-revolutionary dual tactics." Both Chou and the
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial deprecate the President's peace
proposal, with the editorial calling it an effort to "dupe
the people of Indochina into laying down their arms and to
stamp out the flames of the people's revolution in this area."
Chou En-lai also criticizes the United States for having
stage managed the Phnom Penh "farce" of establishing a
republic, and he includes an oblique slap at the Soviets
when he adds that "in collusion with its collaborator,"
the United States is "scheming to carve up Cambodia." He
recalls that Sihanouk has condemned these "schemes of U.S.
imperialism and its collaborator."*

Chou also obliquely attacks the Soviet Union when he recalls
that at the Lusaka conference of nonaligned countries and
during the UN 25th anniversary activities "many countries
condemned the superpowers" for monopolizing international
affairs, contending for "world hegemony," "dividing spheres
of influence," and "using the UN as an instrument" for their
power politics.

* Sihanouk and his government did not mention a "collaborator"
in several statements which denounced President Nixon's
7 October international conference proposal as an effort to
"partition" Cambodia.

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Sihanouk at the rally, as reported by NCNA, routinely expresses his gratitude for the "multifarious aid and complete support" of the PRC, the militant solidarity of the fraternal Vietnamese and Laotian people, and the support of "those reliable friends who have kindly accorded de jure recognition" to his government. He also again scores President Nixon's "deceptive proposals of 'peace' for Indochina," and calls for a U.S. withdrawal from Indochina so that the people can solve their own problems. And he repeats that "for Cambodia, any international conference is unnecessary, and that any international control (like the ICC) is not admissible in our sovereign country."

MOSCOW Moscow acknowledges Cambodian National Day only in routine-level radio commentaries, broadcast in Mandarin to Southeast Asia and in Cambodian on the 9th, which are notable for their failure to mention either Sihanouk or Lon Nol. The broadcasts extol Cambodia's pursuit of an "independent foreign policy" for 17 years, and deplore the hardships and the deteriorating economy following the U.S. and Saigon military intrusion after the coup d'etat. The Cambodian-language commentary does briefly criticize the "current regime" in Cambodia which "colludes with Washington in sabotaging its own economy" and says that Cambodia's own interests demand that it "return to a path of nonalignment, reconsolidate its independence, refuse foreign aid which undermines its position, and adhere to the Geneva agreement on Indochina." Avoiding any mention of the FUNK or RGNU, both commentaries merely note that the "Cambodian People's Liberation Armed Forces" are fighting imperialism.

The Mandarin-language commentary recalls that the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina guaranteed Cambodian independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, and that the USSR and other socialist countries "including the PRC" safeguarded the national interests of the Cambodian people. But it also recalls that the Peking leaders, "having taken the stand of big power nationalism, began to undermine Cambodia's national unity in efforts to establish a system there which is suitable to them."*

* This is presumably a reference to the episode in September 1967 when Sihanouk accused the Chinese of trying to use friendship associations for subversion against the Cambodian Government. See the FBIS SURVEY of 28 September 1967, pages 16-18.

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VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS A message from DRV President Ton Duc Thang to Sihanouk, marking National Day, reaffirms respect for Cambodia's independence, sovereignty, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity and promises Vietnam will "give all-out support till total victory to the just struggle of the valiant Khmer people" As was the case last year, the occasion is marked by comment in an article in the 9 November NHAN DAN, carried by VNA, and an article in the same paper by the Cambodian ambassador, broadcast by Hanoi's domestic service. On 11 November VNA reports that the previous night a meeting was held, under the auspices of the Fatherland Front and the Asian-African Solidarity Committee, to mark an international week of solidarity with Cambodia.* Party Central Committee member Hoang Quoc Viet delivered the opening speech at the meeting and the main address was given by Hoang Minh Giam, an official of the Fatherland Front and vice chairman of the Asian-African Solidarity Committee. Giam promised that "now as in the past, the Vietnamese people will do their best in conjunction with the Khmer people to defeat the U.S. imperialists and will join them in long-term cooperation to build the country each according to its own way"

A joint message to Sihanouk from NFLSV leader Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat expresses "unreserved and complete support" for the Cambodian "struggle" and promises that the people of South Vietnam will "always unite with the Khmer people and together with them carry the struggle against U.S. aggression through till the common victory of the two nations."

Liberation Radio on the 8th reports that a meeting was held that day to inaugurate a week of solidarity with the Cambodian people. The meeting, organized by the NFLSV Central Committee, was attended by PRG President Phat and Dr. Phung Van Cung, deputy chairman of the Front Central Committee. In a speech to the gathering, Cung is said to have "strongly criticized Nixon's 7 October speech and unmasked the deceitful character and crafty and stubborn

* A Liberation Radio broadcast on 10 November reported that an international conference in solidarity with Laos, held in Cairo last May, had decided to organize a solidarity week with the Khmer people beginning on 9 November.

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nature of the U.S. imperialists." Liberation Radio on the 9th carries an "article" by PRG ambassador to Cambodia Nguyen Van Hieu which, among other things, welcomes Sihanouk's refutation of "Nixon's peace swindle."

NFLSV PROTESTS DRIVES INTO CAMBODIA BY SAIGON TROOPS

Reaction to large-scale ARVN drives into Cambodia on 24-26 October includes Liberation Radio's broadcast on the 11th of an NFLSV Central Committee statement, dated the 5th. To date no acknowledgment of the 6 November movement of South Vietnamese troops into Takeo Province has been monitored.

The 5 November NFLSV Central Committee statement charges that on 26 October Saigon sent 6,000 troops--"supported by U.S. aircraft and artillery--to invade the 'Parrot's Beak' area in Svay Rieng Province and the 'Fishhook' area in Kompong Cham Province." It claims that the move brought to 18,000 the total number of GVN troops in Cambodia. The statement, after routinely decrying U.S.-Saigon "aggression," pledges that the "South Vietnamese armed forces and people," led by the NFLSV and PRG, will "vigorously and effectively support" the Khmer people's "struggle."

Earlier Liberation Radio comment, in a broadcast on the 4th, had noted South Vietnamese statements announcing new operations in Cambodia and then cited foreign news reports of fighting there which, it claimed, indicated that the GVN troops had been "intercepted by Cambodian National Liberation Armed Forces (CNLAF) and sustained many losses" and the outset of their drive. The broadcast charged that the "aggression" against Cambodia had exposed the allies' "stubborn anti-peace posture" and it concluded with an appeal to ARVN troops to not allow themselves to be sent to fight in Cambodia.

Other attention to the fighting includes a VNA report on the 5th which claims the GVN troops were intercepted in Cambodia and "many" companies and battalions put out of action, killing or wounding "thousands." Specific figures on alleged GVN losses in Kompong Cham and Kratie provinces are contained in VNA roundups of the fighting in Cambodia since the 7th.

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FLOODS IN VIETNAM: ALLIES CENSURED, COMMUNIST AID LAUDED

The widespread flooding in the northern provinces of South Vietnam prompts a spate of propaganda beginning on 1 November which publicizes communist relief measures and charges the allies with having increased the damage through their military activities and taking advantage of the floods to harass the populace and carry out military operations.* A NHAN DAN commentary on the 5th compares "the U.S.-puppet criminal acts" to alleged allied actions during typhoons and floods in 1961, 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1969. High-level attention includes messages from PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, DRV President Ton Duc Thang, and the leading organs of the central Trung Bo regional NFLSV and PRG, as well as comment in Paris by Mme. Binh in "additional remarks" at the 5 November session of the talks and a statement by the PRG spokesman in Paris on the 3d. In addition, the chief PRG representative in Hanoi held a press conference on 6 November to denounce allied "crimes" in the flood-stricken areas.

A 31 October letter from the central Trung Bo NFLSV committee and PRG representation, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 4 November, claims that "scores of thousands of compatriots and hundreds of thousands of their houses" have been "swept away." The letter, like some other comment, traces the "main" cause of the "catastrophe" to actions by the allies, who "had torn down the compatriots' houses and hamlets, destroyed their boats, and herded the compatriots into concentration camps and strategic hamlets" so that they "had nothing with which to cope with flood and typhoon." More specific information on the flood damage appears in a 6 November LPA report which says that more than 300,000 people have been rendered homeless and that the flood devastated 50 to 85 percent of the crops in the area. LPA also reports that "2,000 inmates of the Thuong Duc and Kiem Lam concentration camps and 4,000 others of the Hoi An and eastern Duy Xuyen concentration camps were swept away or drowned by the flood waters."

A Liberation Radio commentary on 8 November, echoed in subsequent propaganda, blames the flood damage on allied defoliation and bombing of South Vietnamese watersheds.

* The volume of propaganda on the floods has been unusually heavy. From 1 to 10 November Liberation Radio broadcast more than 75 items on the flood and Hanoi broadcast more than 50.

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This commentary and others ridicule the GVN's "so-called relief work," with Liberation Radio on the 6th charging that the allies will use their relief committee to "take advantage of the compatriots' misfortune to rake in the money, food, and medicines which the people from other parts of the country will contribute." The broadcast goes on to claim that "after the typhoons and floods in 1964 and 1968, the corrupt puppet administration officials stole most of the money, food, and other necessities of life contributed by the people as relief goods"

Some comment, including a Liberation Radio broadcast on the 7th, acknowledges President Thieu's visit to the flood-damaged areas on the 4th and charges he went there to "deceive the people" and "order an intensification in the concentration of people and in conscription."

Allied "crimes" in connection with the floods are officially protested in a 6 November statement by the southern war crimes committee and in a statement by Col. Ha Van Lau, member of the standing committee of the DRV war crimes commission, both broadcast on the 10th.

ASSISTANCE TO FLOOD VICTIMS The initial report of mobilization to meet the emergency, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 2 November, said that the representation of the PRG in central Trung Bo held an extraordinary meeting on 29 October to devise urgent measures to assist the victims and overcome consequences of the flood. The representation, according to the radio, instructed "all echelons of administrative organs and the PLAF and all sectors" to concentrate on carrying out relief activities and mobilizing the people to repair the damage and oppose allied actions. Decisions were also taken to organize assistance committees at all echelons and to send groups of cadres to the localities to guide the implementation of these tasks.

The 31 October letter from the central Trung Bo NFLSV committee and PRG representation announces the decision of the NFLSV and PRG to take 100 million dong from relief funds to assist flood victims. The letter says that the liberation front committee, people's councils, and people's revolutionary committees at all levels are working to overcome the effects of the flood. PRG President Phat's 4 November letter,

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broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 5th, informs "compatriots" in the flooded areas that "the PRG has directed the central Trung Bo PRG representation to take emergency measures to mobilize all forces and abilities to promptly overcome the consequences caused by storms and floods, while taking the decision to use part of the public budget to send a quantity of paddy, rice, money, cloth, and medicines"

There are several reports of communist drives to gather flood relief in different parts of South Vietnam. A Liberation Radio report on 10 November says the PRG representation in central Nam Bo (the southernmost section of South Vietnam) held an extraordinary conference on the 6th to discuss measures to help the flood victims. The conference decided to launch a campaign to provide flood relief, and the regional PRG representation offered five million piasters to help the flood victims. Also on the 10th, Liberation Radio announced that a fund drive for the flood-stricken areas was being launched in Saigon by the Saigon NFLSV, alliance, and people's revolutionary committee.

The message from DRV President Thang, carried by VNA on 5 November, is addressed to NFLSV head Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Phat, who are asked to convey sympathy to the people in the flood-stricken areas and to "turn over to them a quantity of rice, textiles, and medicines." The extent of DRV assistance is spelled out in an 8 November VNA report that Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi on the 7th announced the North Vietnamese Government's decision to present flood victims in the central provinces of South Vietnam with 40,000 tons of rice, four million meters of textiles, and 200 tons of medicines. VNA says Nghi informed Truong Cong Dong, acting head of the PRG representation in the DRV, of this decision. Subsequent DRV propaganda notes low-level emulation efforts to produce more goods in order to provide aid for southern flood victims.

BACKGROUND: Hanoi has publicized the granting of material assistance to the South on previous occasions. A letter from Pham Van Dong to Nguyen Huu Tho in March 1968 announced that the DRV Government had decided to send the NFLSV Central Committee a gift of 50,000 tons of rice, 10 million meters of textiles, and 100 tons of medicines. Propaganda at the time indicated that the aid was intended to "help lessen the difficulties and suffering" caused by the allies "during the recent past." A 16 March 1968 NHAN DAN editorial recalled that rice, textiles, and medicines had been given by the DRV to victims of floods in South Vietnam in November 1964 and September 1966.

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DRV ANNOUNCES PROCEDURES FOR CHRISTMAS MAIL TO U.S. POW'S

For the third consecutive year, the DRV announces that U.S. prisoners of war in the North may receive holiday mail. VNA carried the notice on 9 November, earlier than in 1968 and 1969, stipulating that parcels must be sent via Moscow "in accordance with the procedures already laid down" and that those sent in any other way will not be accepted. The notice adds that the parcels may weigh 5 kilograms instead of 3 and that greetings to the prisoners may be sent either "by post"--presumably via Moscow--or in care of the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen, New York.

Last year, VNA carried a notice from the DRV General Department of Posts and Telecommunications on 18 November saying that gifts could be sent from 1 through 31 December 1969 "according to procedures stipulated on previous occasions." Procedures had been outlined on 23 July 1969 in a VNA item, which referred back to the 3 July announcement on the release of some U.S. prisoners and the decision to allow gifts to be sent to prisoners on the occasion of U.S. Independence Day. The item on the 23d stated that the address should be Hanoi, in care of Moscow, and that the weight of the parcels should not exceed 3 kilograms--6.6 pounds. VNA said that the procedure was the same as that established for Christmas 1968, but propaganda at that time is not known to have spelled out the regulations. On 13 December 1968 VNA merely announced the decision of the VPA's General Political Department that U.S. pilots could receive Christmas gifts.

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR SAYS UAR ACTS ON UNGA RESOLUTION, EXTENDS CEASE-FIRE

In a moderate amount of propaganda on the UN General Assembly debate on the Middle East, Moscow sustains the line that Israel and the United States found themselves "isolated." Propaganda for the most part gives only pro forma support to the Afro-Asian draft resolution adopted on 4 November, noting that Israel and the United States were "among the few" to have opposed it and explaining the Soviet vote as based on the resolution's aim of solving the dispute by political means. Propaganda underlines UAR President as-Sadat's decision to extend the cease-fire and hold contacts with Jarring, contrasting it with Israel's statements rejecting the UNGA resolution and calling renewal of Jarring's mission "less probable" than before.

UNGA RESOLUTION Reporting the adoption of the resolution, TASS notes that the vote was 57 to 16 with 39 abstentions, the latter being "mainly" Latin American countries which moved for Assembly consideration of their own draft resolution, although it did not get the necessary majority. TASS points out that apart from Israel and the United States, those who voted against included Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands, as well as some Afro-Asian and Latin American countries "which are under the strong influence" of the United States. Noting that France supported the resolution and Britain abstained, TASS fails to indicate that seven Arab countries, including Algeria, Syria, and Iraq, did not participate in the vote. Although TASS' summary of the resolution fails to mention operative paragraphs two and seven, the omission does not seem significant: Paragraph two incorporates principles drawn from Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967, whose implementation is continuously urged by Moscow; the request in paragraph seven that U Thant report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on Jarring's efforts and implementation of Resolution 242 was touched on in earlier Soviet propaganda on the UNGA debate.

Comment on the resolution underlines its confirmation of the inadmissibility of acquiring territories by force. In a dispatch in PRAVDA on the 6th, Kolesnichenko additionally singles out for attention the resolution's call for implementation of Resolution 242 providing for Israeli withdrawal and recognition of Palestinian rights, its call for renewal of

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contacts with Jarring, and its recommendation for extension of the cease-fire for another three months. Kolesnichenko also notes the resolution's request that the Security Council examine, if necessary, the question of "additional measures" to insure implementation of Resolution 242.* Asserting that the Assembly has charted "realistic paths" to a speedy political settlement, Kolesnichenko urges implementation of the resolution and says all attempts at evasion must be regarded as rejection of a peaceful settlement.

IZVESTIYA on the 7th scoffs at the New York TIMES for calling the UNGA resolution evidence of a lack of peaceful intentions on the part of the UAR and for arguing that the resolution has weakened the United Nations' status as an instrument of peace. If one is to believe the TIMES' equilibristics, the paper says, Israel's attempt to retain the Arab lands, with U.S. assistance, strengthens the status of the United Nations while the UAR's consent to an immediate restoration of contacts with Jarring shows a lack of peaceful intentions.

CAIRO Moscow approvingly cites the UAR's agreement to an
STANCE extension of the cease-fire, an effusive commentary
 in Arabic on the 6th repeatedly praising Cairo's new
and important "peaceful, positive initiative." Soviet media
report but do not stress Egypt's condition for an extension,
a Moscow domestic service broadcast on the 4th noting that the
UAR official spokesman called resumption of the Jarring mission
a "necessary condition" of a truce extension. TASS on the 6th
cites the Cairo AL-AHRAM as saying the UAR attaches great
importance to the extension, "having in view" a resumption of
Jarring's mission during this period. TASS also notes that
UAR Foreign Minister Riyad, meeting with Jarring on the 6th,
reaffirmed Cairo's readiness to prolong the cease-fire agreement

* Soviet UN delegate Malik, in a UN anniversary article in KOMMUNIST No. 15 (signed to press 19 October), thought it possible that the question of measures to compel fulfillment of Security Council decisions "will be posed with increasing acuteness" and cited Israel's "cynical ignoring" of UN decisions on Middle East questions, particularly Resolution 242. He also said U Thant believed that for Security Council decisions to be effective, the permanent members should be in "agreement on specific paths" of implementation.

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for three months "in accordance with the UNGA resolution." While reporting Riyadh's meeting with U Thant, TASS on the 9th does not include his remark that-- according to Cairo radio's account--the UAR under no circumstances will accept a third extension of the cease-fire.

ISRAELI ATTITUDE Commentators almost uniformly contrast the UAR's attitude with Israel's. Thus Orestov asserts in the 7 November PRAVDA that the Israeli leaders were "compelled" to agree to a cease-fire extension. Like other propagandists, Orestov points to Mrs. Meir's "rejection" of the UNGA resolution in remarks made in London and says Foreign Minister Eban met with Jarring "for the sole purpose" of telling him Israel refuses to implement the resolution. A widely broadcast foreign-language commentary by Samilovskiy also points out that while the UAR immediately stated that it was ready to extend the cease-fire and take part in talks with Jarring, Israel said it was not prepared to resume the contacts and the United States "immediately supported Israel" and charged supporters of the UNGA resolution with lack of objectivity.

SUSLOV ON MIDEAST In his October Revolution anniversary speech on the 6th, Suslov routinely dismissed the "false charges" that the USSR is "not fulfilling the cease-fire conditions" in the Suez Canal zone, calling these allegations diversionary maneuvers designed to "whitewash" Israel and its protectors. He accused the Israeli "adventurists" of hostility toward UN decisions on a political settlement of the crisis, charging that they are motivated not by a desire to insure Israel the right to independent national existence "on a par with other states in that area," but by annexationist aims. He proclaimed the justness of the cause of liberating the occupied territories and "not allowing interference" in the Arabs' internal affairs, and he made the customary pledge of Soviet support for the Arab peoples' struggle for their legitimate rights, including the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, and for an early political settlement.

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SUSLOV SPEECH

REASSERTION OF PEACE POLICY, NO MENTION OF DISARMAMENT

Suslov's 6 November keynote address for the 53d October Revolution anniversary offered nothing essentially new in the customary review of foreign policy questions. But while reaffirming Soviet pursuit of a foreign policy aimed at preventing war and charging the United States with pursuit of the arms race, Suslov notably failed to mention any disarmament issues.* The omission departs from the pattern of October Revolution anniversary speeches in recent years. In delivering the anniversary speech last year, Podgorny had expressed hope for positive results from SALT, scheduled to open within two weeks, and had taken note of the socialist bloc's proposal for a ban on chemical and bacteriological weapons-- then as now a question before the UN General Assembly.

Suslov defined the USSR's "Leninist" foreign policy as aimed, among other things, at insuring peaceful conditions for the building of socialism and communism, at strengthening the principles of peaceful coexistence, and at preventing war at a time when U.S. "imperialism" is continuing its policy of "criminal aggression and the arms race." Consistent with propaganda following the U.S. charges that the USSR was building a submarine base in Cuba and the intrusion of a U.S. plane into Soviet airspace on 21 October,** Suslov declared that the United States is "preserving and strengthening its military bases scattered throughout the world directed against the socialist countries, above all against the Soviet Union." The USSR, he said, would maintain watchfulness against imperialist plans, perfecting and arming its army and navy "with the most up-to-date weapons so

* Suslov last endorsed the goal of general and complete disarmament in remarks on 29 September before the Foreign Affairs Commissions of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet, which were then considering ratification of the 7 July USSR-Romanian friendship treaty. In his 24 November 1969 speech at a session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet considering ratification of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, he called the NPT a step leading to the resolution "of the vitally important problem of universal disarmament."

** TASS on 10 November announced the release of the U.S. and Turkish officers who were aboard the aircraft.

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as to be able, if need be, to give a shattering rebuff to those who might encroach on the sacred frontiers of our homeland." Defense Minister Grechko, in his Order of the Day as well as in his 7 November Red Square speech, similarly pledged a continuing effort to strengthen the capabilities of the USSR's armed forces against an imperialist threat.

EUROPEAN ISSUES Suslov hailed the 12 August FRG-Soviet treaty in standard terms as an important step toward improving bilateral relations as well as the general climate in Europe. As Brezhnev had done in his speeches on 28 August and 2 October, in Alma-Ata and Baku, Suslov said that the "full weight" of the accord will come into play when it is ratified. It is over this issue, he added, that a struggle with "reactionary forces . . . opposed to the establishment of good relations with the Soviet Union" has developed. In keeping with Moscow's generally restrained treatment of the FRG Government, however, he did not address himself to Chancellor Brandt's long-standing contention that ratification is dependent on progress in the four-power talks on Berlin.

Suslov noted with satisfaction a growing sentiment among various circles in Europe in favor of a relaxation of tensions and a broadening of cooperation in commercial and scientific-technical fields. Differences among states on certain issues, he said, "must not be allowed to obscure those fields where cooperation is possible and useful, above all where it is essential to avert the threat to mankind of a missile and nuclear war." He followed this observation with an endorsement of the socialist countries' proposal for the convening of a conference on European security. The "necessary preconditions" for "practical preparations" for such a conference exist, he said, warning at the same time that it "would be unforgiveable not to see in Europe the lively activity of the forces of aggressive militarism and revanchism, which continue to hatch their devious plans for reshaping the map of Europe."

STRESS ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, WORLD COMMUNIST UNITY

Suslov's statements on relations among the socialist countries emphasized economic integration under CEMA rather than military integration under the Warsaw Pact. He did not refer to the Pact, which Defense Minister Grechko mentioned in his Order of the Day but not in his speech at the Red Square parade on the 7th.

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Citing CEMA at the outset of his remarks on the world socialist system, Suslov noted that the member countries "alone account for over one-third of total world production although they have only 10 percent of the world population." Declaring that "the economic and military might of the socialist countries has increased" in 1970, he reported that "protocols are now being signed for coordination of national economic plans for 1971-75" and that "the integrated long-term program of the development of socialist economic integration is beginning to be implemented."

Suslov went on to cite the socialist countries' "foreign political cooperation" under the network of bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance, listing "recent" new treaties--signed in the period since 1964--between the USSR and the GDR, Poland, the MPR, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania.*

Skirting the subject of Czechoslovakia's 1968 "counterrevolution"--a topic highlighted in anniversary speeches on the 5th in Prague by CPCZ Presidium member and Secretary Bilak and Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko--Suslov took the tack of denouncing "ideologists of imperialism and its revisionist flunkeys; who have made every effort to whitewash and embellish the bourgeois system and to remove from the agenda the necessity of a revolutionary transformation of capitalist society."**

Suslov transparently raised the issue of Czechoslovakia, however, in remarks on the unity of the world communist movement in the wake of the June 1969 Moscow international party conference. He noted an intensification of the struggle, in the postconference period, against attempts by "revisionists and nationalists to distort the policy of the fraternal communist parties and the theory of Marxism-Leninism." With Garaudy and Ernst Fischer--expelled this year from the French and Austrian CP's, respectively--evidently in mind, he noted that "opportunists of all kinds attempt to impose on the communist parties a pattern of actions which would unavoidably lead to weakening the revolutionary workers movement." He added that "it is natural for communists to draw certain conclusions from this" and to "expel" such opportunists from their ranks.

* The Bucharest SCINTEIA's account of Suslov's speech includes the reference to the bilateral treaties but ignores all the passages on CEMA and world communist unity.

** He went on to score also the "adventurist leftist pseudorevolutionaries" in passages leading up to his remarks on relations with Peking. See the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW, PEKING EXCHANGE APPEALS FOR NORMAL STATE RELATIONS

Both sides have taken the occasion of the October Revolution anniversary to reaffirm their commitment to negotiations on Sino-Soviet state relations while indicating that their ideological differences remain as basic as ever. In the anniversary keynote address on 6 November, Suslov expressed the hope that the Peking talks will lead to success in normalizing state relations but added that the Soviets will stand firm on their ideological positions. The Chinese message on the anniversary, while not mentioning the talks directly, renewed the call for normal state relations despite "differences of principle" which had been made in the 7 October 1969 PRC Government statement announcing agreement to open negotiations.

MOSCOW In his brief remarks on Sino-Soviet relations Suslov observed that the Peking talks "cannot be described as easy," but he followed Soviet practice since last spring in avoiding direct censure of the Chinese for causing the stalemate and in blandly expressing a hope for progress in normalizing state relations. Strengthening the impression that Brezhnev's 28 August Alma-Ata speech stands as the principal Soviet policy statement on China, Suslov invoked the CPSU chief's call for normalization of relations between the two countries. As befits his role as ideologue, Suslov was more explicit than Brezhnev in declaring that the Soviets would "continue upholding our Marxist-Leninist positions on ideological questions." Similarly, in another passage he took a swipe at "adventurist leftist pseudorevolutionaries" who oppose the line of peaceful coexistence. But despite such signs that he may be chafing at the bit of polemical restraint now inhibiting Soviet elite comment on China, Suslov did not indulge in any direct ideological attacks on Peking.*

* In a passage discussing the results of the June 1969 Moscow international communist conference, Suslov expressed satisfaction over the "intensified" struggle against "revisionists and nationalists" and called for expulsion from the communist ranks of "opportunists of all kinds." While the language is generalized, the thrust of these remarks seems aimed at dissident and autonomist elements within Moscow's sphere of influence in the communist movement rather than at the Chinese. This aspect is covered in today's TRENDS in the section headlined "Suslov Speech."

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PRAVDA (8 November) edited the PRC message by deleting a reference to Stalin's tutelage in a sentence calling on the Soviets to "carry forward the glorious traditions" of the October Revolution. While engaging in a partial rehabilitation of Stalin, the post-Khrushchev Kremlin leadership has from the outset been concerned to avoid giving the impression that a switch from a polemical to an irenic approach to the Chinese reflected capitulation to PRC pressure.

An absence of anti-Chinese polemics in the Soviet central press was broken by an article on the anniversary in the 6 November RED STAR by V. Korionov, a major commentator on communist affairs. Referring to the benefits accruing from the alliance of socialist countries, the article held up Peking as a negative object lesson on the "moral and political isolation" resulting from separation from the "family" of socialist countries. The article referred to "the Maoist group," an anathema formula that the Soviets have largely avoided in recent months. That this hardline formula, in an article by an author who normally writes for PRAVDA, should appear in RED STAR might suggest impatience among the military over the restraints imposed by Moscow's China policy. It does express, coming as it does in a passage hailing the "indestructible alliance" embodied in the Warsaw Pact, Moscow's interest in a show of unity among its allies against the Chinese.

Soviet broadcasts beamed to the Chinese have elaborated on Suslov's appeal for normalized relations, recalling the benefits from past Sino-Soviet cooperation and holding up the Soviet experience as the proper model for a communist nation. Comment keyed to the anniversary has avoided blaming the Chinese for lack of progress at the Peking talks, but a Mandarin broadcast on 5 November was unusually forthright in charging the Chinese with taking a hostile approach not conducive to a normalization of relations. After citing the Kosygin-Chou meeting last year, the opening of the Peking talks, negotiations on trade and border river navigation, and the appointment of a Soviet ambassador as signs of good will, the commentary complained that the Chinese had not reciprocated and had engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda at the time of the ambassador's arrival. In adducing evidence of this hostile attitude the commentary made a rare reference to last year's border clashes, citing pictures published by Peking showing heroic Chinese soldiers on Damanskiy Island.

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PEKING The PRC message, like last year's, was sent in the name of the NPC Standing Committee and the State Council to their Soviet counterparts and greeted "the fraternal Soviet people." Also in the pattern of last year, Peking reported a film reception cosponsored by the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association and a Soviet embassy reception (hosted by new ambassador Tolstikov) attended by Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, head of the PRC delegation at the Peking talks.

The Chinese message, while not mentioning the Peking talks, calls on the Soviets to take "effective measures to settle important outstanding questions"--not specified--in the state relations between the two countries. The effect of the message is to reaffirm the line taken in the 7 October 1969 government statement announcing agreement to open negotiations and to match Moscow's show of dedication to a negotiated adjustment of relations. It does not, however, serve to offset the signs of stalemate in the protracted Peking talks.

Twice as long as last year's, the message follows the line of the October 1969 statement in calling for normal state relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and in taking explicit note of the underlying ideological rift--the "differences of principle"--dividing the two sides. It also includes an ideological thrust in expressing a conviction that the Soviet people "educated by the great Lenin and Stalin will certainly inherit and carry forward the glorious traditions" of the October Revolution.

The reference to peaceful coexistence, a concept conventionally applicable to relations between communist and noncommunist countries, as the basis for Sino-Soviet relations reflects the basic ideological schism sundering the alliance. This application of the doctrine is a corollary of Peking's formal identification--in Lin Piao's political report to the April 1969 CCP congress--of the Soviet bloc ("social imperialism") with the enemy side in the "fundamental contradictions" of the present era. A different use of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence was made by the Chinese in their effort to mediate bloc conflict during the period of destalinization strains following the 1956 CPSU congress: A PRC Government statement on 1 November 1956 demanded that mutual relations among socialist countries be based on the principles of

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peaceful coexistence. Subsequently, however, the doctrine was held to apply to relations between countries with different political systems. Thus, Peking's programmatic "general line" for the communist movement issued on 14 June 1963 listed the following basic aspects of a socialist foreign policy: "friendship, mutual assistance, and cooperation" among the socialist countries; peaceful coexistence on the basis of the five principles with countries having different social systems; and support for revolutionary struggles. In the present phase, the Soviet Union having undergone a "restoration of capitalism" under revisionist leadership, Peking regards its relations with Moscow as falling within the second category.

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ALLENDE INAUGURATION

MOSCOW HAILS UNITED FRONT VICTORY AS MILESTONE FOR HEMISPHERE

Fairly extensive Soviet news coverage of Salvador Allende's inauguration as president of Chile on 3 November is accompanied by comment depicting his advent to power as a victory for united front tactics having implications for all of Latin America. Suslov gave authoritative expression to the broad Soviet view in remarking in his October Revolution anniversary address that "the national liberation struggle of the peoples in Latin America is spreading and intensifying: more than 10 years ago the Cuban revolution smashed the chain of imperialist oppression in Latin American countries, and new links in this chain have become apparent recently in Peru, Chile, and Bolivia."

The significance of the Chilean events for the hemisphere is brought up in an IZVESTIYA interview with Allende, featured in the paper on 5 November (morning edition), in the question "How do you assess the present situation in Latin America?" IZVESTIYA quotes Allende's reply to the effect that "national forces, which are much alike in their aims and which are similar to those which today inspire the victorious Chilean people, are struggling and gaining strength in one form or another in various Latin American countries."

TASS commentator Chigir on 4 November defined Allende's success-- a victory for Chilean unity that is "difficult to overestimate"-- as a "milestone" for the hemisphere as a whole. "The success of the People's Unity Movement that united the widest masses of the Chilean working people, all the patriots of the country," Chigir said, "is at the same time the success of the entire national liberation, anti-imperialist movement of Latin America which has assumed unprecedented scope of late." Picturing Chile, as Suslov did, as a new link in the broad chain begun by Cuba, Chigir went on to reiterate--in low key--the Soviet case for a flexible, diversified revolutionary strategy, in effect representing the Chilean events as a vindication of Soviet support for the parliamentary alternative to the Cuban route to power. The national liberation struggle in Latin America "assumes different forms in various countries on the continent and is at different stages there," he said. With both the Cuban and Chilean examples in the background, "the peoples come increasingly to realize that only they themselves can and must decide their own destiny."

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The notion of the Allende regime as part of a developing chain reaction in Latin America is also conveyed, in broadcasts to Latin America, by a portrayal of the United States as anxiously casting about for ways to weaken the Allende government out of fear of its impact on other hemisphere countries. It was with this objective in mind, according to a Moscow broadcast to Brazil on 9 November, that "the bosses of Anaconda copper carried out another subversive action by decreasing the extraction of copper in order to bring about economic difficulties" in Chile. Pointing to allegedly rising U.S. concern over the "political and psychological" effects of the Chilean example, the commentator asked: "Who would classify as normal the pressure exerted by the U.S. propaganda machine on Costa Rica due to that country's decision to establish friendly relations with the socialist countries without U.S. permission?"

Over the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on the 6th, Moscow suggested ominously that in the aftermath of the Chilean elections Washington "is reconsidering at top speed its plans for extending its military bases in case armed intervention against that country becomes necessary." The 9 November Radio Moscow broadcast to Brazil, however, cited the Washington POST to the effect that "official circles are not now mentioning the possibility of direct military intervention in Chile," resorting rather to indirect tactics to counter the impact of a regime solidly in power.

Soviet commentators foresee "profound socio-economic transformations" and real opportunities to "get rid of the rule of U.S. monopolies" under a genuinely popular Chilean regime. A 5 November PRAVDA dispatch recounting the "exciting day" of Allende's inauguration remarks that the new government is the first in Chile's history to represent "all the democratic strata of the people on a broad basis." As it has done from the outset, Moscow plays down the specific role of the Chilean Communist Party.

CHILE-USSR Soviet media on 25 October publicized Podgorny's
RELATIONS message to Allende expressing "sincere" congratula-
 tions on his election and a hope for "wider develop-
ment of relations of friendship and mutually advantageous coopera-
tion between the two countries." On 6 November the radio reported
that Allende had received the Soviet delegation to the inauguration
festivities, led by Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium
Dzotsenidze. They discussed "the further development of commercial,
scientific-technical, and cultural relations" between the two
countries," according to the Soviet report.

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The IZVESTIYA interview with Allende includes the Chilean President's statement, in response to a question about the main principles of his government's foreign policy, that Chile will seek cordial relations with all countries on the principles of "the people's self-determination and of noninterference in other countries' domestic affairs" and that it will develop relations with the Soviet Union "on the economic, cultural, and diplomatic plane."

PEKING REMAINS CAUTIOUS IN APPROACH TO ALLENDE GOVERNMENT

PRC media continue to exhibit caution in their approach to a regime that came to power via the peaceful parliamentary road in an electoral coalition that included the Soviet-ling Chilean Communist Party. Consistent with Chinese propaganda following Allende's electoral victory on 4 September,* NCNA accounts of the inaugural ceremonies make no reference to Allende's political affiliation, referring to him simply as "the Chilean President." But Peking has moved to court a regime that affords the PRC an opportunity to gain a diplomatic foothold in Latin America at a time when the Chinese are attempting to broaden their diplomatic base worldwide.

Chou En-lai's message to Allende upon his election by the Chilean congress, carried by NCNA on 28 October, "warmly" congratulated him and cited the Chinese people's support for the Chilean people "in their just struggle against imperialist aggression, plunder, and interference and in defense of national independence and state sovereignty." An unofficial Chinese delegation, described by NCNA on 29 October as a "workers delegation" but including two party Central Committee members, attended the investiture ceremony. NCNA reported on the 9th that Chilean Interior Minister Toha and Foreign Minister Almeyda attended a Chinese reception and had "friendly talks with members of the workers delegation." The guests, NCNA said, repeatedly toasted Mao's health, friendship between the Chilean and Chinese peoples, "and victory of the world peoples' struggle against U.S. imperialism and in defense of national sovereignty."

* See the 23 September 1970 TRENDS, page 38, for a view of Peking's circumspect treatment of the 4 September election outcome and for background on earlier Peking comment denigrating the "parliamentary road."

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A 7 November NCNA account of the "mammoth" rally addressed by Allende in Santiago takes note of the Chilean president's pledge to "put an end to monopolies" and nationalize copper and other mineral resources. It also contains the closest approach to date in Peking media to an acknowledgment of Allende's public commitment to establish relations with communist countries, specifically including the PRC. NCNA quotes Allende's remarks, "I want to salute the delegation from those countries with which we still have no diplomatic relations. Chile will do them justice by recognizing their governments."

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P R C I N T E R N A L A F F A I R S

DRAFT PRC CONSTITUTION RELEASED BY TAIPEI MEDIA

The draft constitution of the PRC, as released by Taipei news media on 4 November, appears from internal evidence to be genuine. While this version is only a draft, it is unlikely that the final document will be greatly altered, in light of the fact that the draft was approved by the Central Committee plenum last September. In the end, the final version of the party constitution closely resembled the previously released draft.

Like the party constitution, the state charter is basically a tract intended to enshrine Mao and Mao's Thought. Mao is designated as "head of state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and "supreme commander" of the PLA; Lin Piao is termed his "successor" and "deputy supreme commander." There is no provision for their joint departure from the scene, nor for Lin's untimely demise.

The constitution makes the government more directly the creature of the party. Under the 1954 constitution, the PRC was a multiparty "people's democratic" state with power belonging "to the people as represented by the NPC" and local assemblies. Under the new constitution the PRC has advanced to the stage of "a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" led by the working class "through the CCP." All powers are now more generally apportioned simply "to the people," perhaps indicating that, while the people's congresses "exercise" the people's power, the party is the final authority of the people's will.

State organs must now follow the example of revolutionary committees and "enforce the revolutionary three-way alliances of the army, cadres, and masses as well as of the old, middle-aged, and young." The latter provision, not originally a part of the three-way alliance formula but more recently noted in the media, may prove administratively beneficial in reducing the power of pre-1949 cadres who often lack the qualifications for their current posts. While a cadre-army-masses alliance in state organs is unlikely to produce any more power for the masses than they now seem to exercise in the revolutionary committees, the PLA will apparently gain a formal and permanent role in the civil sector. This marks a significant change from

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the post-1949 period of military rule when PLA officers assumed civilian functions but terminated their active military duties. Under the new constitution they will apparently retain military rank, duties, and discipline, and rely on military channels for promotion while exercising--if the cultural revolution pattern continues--dominant administrative power throughout the country.

ECONOMY The draft constitution does not advocate any radical economic changes and indicates a continuation of policies in force for most of the past decade. In line with Maoist dogma, the transition stage of socialism is foreseen to be a lengthy period, and at the present stage the system of ownership will not be changed. The commune system will retain the team as the basic accounting unit, and the ownership of small private plots and of houses and tools will be continued. Reflecting the change to a "socialist" state, there are no longer any real guarantees of land ownership, handicraft rights, or right of inheritance. Predictably, the guarantees to capitalists have also been dropped.

RIGHTS OF CITIZENS The PRC is still officially proclaimed a "multinational" state, and the continued existence of the "autonomous regions" for minority groups is recognized. But while nationalities may still "use their spoken and written languages," the 1954 provisions that they may "develop" their languages and "preserve or reform their habits and customs" have been dropped. Freedom of religion has officially been retained, and certain new "freedoms" have been granted. Freedom to strike is now said to be one of the rights of citizens, and the airing of opinions in posters and debates "to create a lively political situation" is encouraged. But such activity is said to be subject to "discipline" and "unity." The primary duty of citizens as enumerated by the new charter is to support Mao, and secondarily to support the CCP.

JUSTICE The 1954 provision that "all citizens are equal before the law" apparently no longer holds. The law has lost its Western gloss of being an entity unto itself, and the courts are now explicitly creatures of the people's congress at the corresponding level. Judges have no fixed terms of office, but again are subject to the pleasure of the congresses. Courts of law are expected to follow the "mass line," and in "important cases of counterrevolution" the masses must join in the procedure through discussion and criticism--a standard cultural revolution practice.

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**NATIONAL PEOPLE'S
CONGRESS**

The supreme state organ is still the National People's Congress, (NPC), with its standing committee and chairman exercising power while it is not in session. There is no provision for the election of a chief of state, and the entire section previously devoted to the office has been eliminated. Most of Liu Shao-chi's former duties remain with the NPC and will presumably be exercised by the NPC chairman, although Mao has been assigned the PRC chairman's former role as army supreme commander and given personal rank as "head of state of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

The structure of the NPC has apparently been little changed, although its term of office has been extended from four years to a very flexible five-year term which may be extended "under special circumstances." The membership criteria differ slightly from those in 1954, with a provision that "in case of necessity a certain number of patriotic personalities" may take part. This proviso would allow the center to stack the congressional deck in case of necessity, but it is perhaps primarily intended to serve as a means of retaining some flexibility, a primary aim of the charter. Under the provision, aged noncommunist leaders could be placed on the NPC without actually electing them. The category may also be used for Hong Kong or Taiwan delegates who are not considered overseas Chinese but who cannot be elected.

The powers of the NPC have been considerably weakened by the new constitution. Even its power to appoint the premier is now subject to the "recommendation of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party." While the NPC still "examines" the state budget, there is now no specific requirement for its approval. There is no mention of its former power to decide on war or peace, nor of the National Defense Council, a prestigious collection of old military leaders formerly responsible to the NPC. One predictable omission in the light of cultural revolution events is the clause insuring immunity from arrest for NPC members.

**REVOLUTIONARY
COMMITTEES**

The existing revolutionary committee system, coopted by the constitution into the formal government structure, will form the basis of the new system of local government. The revolutionary committees, which are more directly controlled by the party than the previous government councils, are to act as standing committees for local people's congresses, yet to be elected. The revolutionary committees will be responsible to the congresses

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and to "the state organs at a higher level." In the light of current power alignments in the revolutionary committees, their new role seems to assure continuance of a dominant administrative role for the PLA.

CADRE DEFICIENCIES THREATEN PARTY-BUILDING CAMPAIGN

Recent PRC broadcasts continue to decry the failings of cadres at the leadership level and indicate provincial plans to require additional study of Mao's Thought as the panacea. Like the Cheng Feng Movement of 1942-44, which some broadcasts cite as an antecedent, the current campaign appears designed at least in part to provide discipline and ideological guidance during a period of party rebuilding and growth. Thus NCNA on 21 October applauded the Chiente county party committee in Chekiang for its success in using veteran cadres and military representatives to train the large number of new cadres who have emerged in the county during the cultural revolution in Mao's thought.

A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, released by NCNA on 30 October, added momentum to the campaign, explaining that "the purpose of our study" of Mao's philosophic works is "to raise the theoretical level of the whole party," which is now the "fundamental task" in rebuilding the party. On 29 October, Radio Peking broadcast a PEOPLE'S DAILY article which complained that while workers, peasants and soldiers had learned the importance of studying Mao's works during the cultural revolution, some cadres still do not "correctly accept the lesson."

Nanking radio on 28 October broadcast a HSINHUA DAILY editorial portraying the current campaign as one that is "under the personal guidance of Chairman Mao" and is linked to past study movements within the party, including "the rectification campaign launched in 1942" which--the editorial stressed--united the whole party by 1945. The editorial forcefully argued that the present effort to study Mao's works "is not a trivial problem" but an "urgent militant task" to be "solved immediately." The link to the 1942 rectification movement as well as to Mao's personal concern for the present campaign was again expressed in a HUNAN DAILY editorial broadcast by Changsha radio on 27 October. The editorial dredged up a Mao quotation of 32 years ago, not recently publicized but part of the Cheng Feng study

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documents: "I hope to see an all-party emulation in study which will show who has really learned something and who has learned more and learned better." Complaining that some cadres cannot "distinguish between right and wrong nor be clear about their orientation" in carrying out party policies, the editorial urged a mass campaign to study Mao's Thought to correct their mistaken political outlook.

Kansu and Kiangsu have announced formal procedures for provincewide study of Mao's philosophic works. Lanchow radio on 4 November reported that in response to the party plenum communique issued in September, which called for more study of Mao's thought at the leadership level, the Kansu Provincial Revolutionary Committee (RC) has decided that the "top leaders" of party committees, core groups, and revolutionary committees must lead "the masses of personnel of party committees and revolutionary committees" in studying Mao's thought in an "organized, well-planned way." Progress reports must be sent to the RC; Tuesday and Thursday afternoons must be regarded as periods of study throughout the province, and "under no circumstances should any change be made."

A Nanking radio report on 27 October indicates that the Kiangsu Provincial Revolutionary Committee has issued a similar plan for cadres, "particularly those at or above county level," to "observe special days for studying" until Mao's thoughts are "memorized as though they had taken deep root in our minds." Revolutionary committees at special district and municipal levels must make regular checks and submit periodic reports to the RC on the progress of leading cadres at all levels.

Cadre deficiencies in Kwangtung appear to be threatening the meager gains of the 18-month campaign to rebuild the party there. Canton radio on 3 November broadcast a NANFANG DAILY editorial that called on those party branches which have done above-average rectification work to "raise standards," while those which have not done well "should start the work again from the very beginning." The editorial urged that a renewed effort be made to mobilize the masses to "conduct assessments of the party branches and members" and gradually to establish new party committees "in a planned way" at the county, special district, and municipal levels in the more advanced areas.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

WRITERS UNION LEADERSHIP RESHUFFLED PRIOR TO CONGRESS

In preparation for the upcoming fifth congress of the USSR Writers Union, the union's organizational secretary, K.V. Voronkov, has been replaced by a party official, Yu. N. Verchenko. The move occurred at a 4 November plenum of the Writers Union board, which also announced that the fifth congress will convene in June next year.

Verchenko was director of the Komsomol's publishing house and a member of the Komsomol Central Committee bureau under S.P. Pavlov, former Komsomol first secretary. In March 1968 he left the Komsomol leadership and became head of the culture section of the Moscow city party committee. As Moscow culture chief, Verchenko has been known for ideological orthodoxy, especially for his insistence on party control over the Moscow theaters (see MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 14 December 1969).

This change does not, presumably, signify any ideological shift: Voronkov was one of Solzhenitsyn's main assailants in the Writers Union leadership and presented the report on Solzhenitsyn's expulsion from the union at a meeting last December of the secretariat of the Moscow Writers Union board (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 2 December 1969). Voronkov has been transferred to the post of USSR deputy culture minister--an unusual appointment for a Writers Union official.

Changes in the RSFSR and Moscow writers union leaderships occurred earlier this year. At the RSFSR Writers Union congress in March, the 72-year old L.S. Sobolev was retired and replaced as RSFSR Writers Union chairman by S.V. Mikhalkov (SOVIET RUSSIA, 28 March 1970). At a May plenum of the Moscow Writers Union Mikhalkov was relieved of his post as Moscow first secretary and replaced by conservative S.S. Narovchatov (PRAVDA, 19 May). Hardliner Mikhalkov has been one of Solzhenitsyn's most frequent critics.

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TERSE, UNINFORMATIVE COMMUNIQUE REPORTS ON BILATERAL TALKS

A brief, uninformative communique on 9-10 November talks in Sofia between high-level Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegations indicates that except for an agreement to continue to talk, the meeting brought little progress toward the resolution of differences. The communique, as carried by TANJUG on the 10th, merely reports that the two delegations "set forth their stands" on current matters in bilateral relations and agreed that the talks would continue at an unspecified date. The Yugoslav delegation was led by Council of the Federation and Executive Committee member Vlahovic, while Politburo member Velchev headed the Bulgarian side. Deputy foreign ministers of both countries took part in the talks, according to TANJUG.

TANJUG had reported on 9 November that the talks were initiated by an exchange of letters between Zhivkov and Tito on the need for "further developing relations." On 19 September Radio Sofia had disclosed that Tito's reply to a letter from Zhivkov had been delivered to the Bulgarian leader by the Yugoslav ambassador in Sofia. Details on the exchange of letters have not been officially revealed, but the Paris LE MONDE said on 3 September that Zhivkov's letter had proposed a meeting between the two party leaders, the signing of a Bulgarian-Yugoslav friendship treaty, and a renunciation of territorial ambitions.

The perennial Macedonian question is at the core of the frictions between the two countries: The Yugoslavs insist that the population of Macedonia is Yugoslav, while the Bulgarians claim it is Bulgarian. Summing up the dispute in a Radio Zagreb commentary on 7 September, Yugoslav commentator Milika Sundic said that the essence of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute "consists of Bulgaria's claims on a Yugoslav republic." The conflicting claims have been the subject of recurrent low-level polemics in the media of the two countries. There was a flareup in June, for example, when according to the Skoplje party daily NOVA MACEDONIA on 5 July, the Yugoslav delegation at a Sofia meeting submitted the draft of a bilateral economic agreement which the Bulgarians refused to sign because it was in Macedonian.

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